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Canadian Civil-Military Relations 
in the Early “Command Era,” 
1945-1955
Forging a Normative Prescription Through 
Rational Analysis
H U G U E S  C A N U E L
Abstract: This study challenges the classic view of Canadian civil-military 
relations (cmr) during the early Cold War as a period of congruence in 
contrast to the subsequent crises of the early 1960s. Framing the period 
within Peter Feaver’s Agency Theory shows that cmr vacillated through 
post-war demobilisation and Cold War rearmament, laying the seeds 
of the more well-known confrontations of the Diefenbaker and Hellyer 
years. Leveraging this historical case allows one to lay the foundation 
of a normative prescription for the conduct of cmr as relevant to the 
particular context of the Cold War as to that of the complex circumstances 
that Canada faces today.
C a n a d i a n  s c h o l a r  D o u g l a s  Bland labelled the first two decades of the Cold War the “command era” in his 1987 seminal study 
The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada.1 Some recall 
these years with nostalgia given the seeming entente between the 
political class and the military leadership that allowed this middle 
power to achieve a great deal on the international scene despite the
1 Douglas Bland, T h e  A d m in is tr a t io n  o f  D e fe n c e  P o l ic y  in  C a n a d a , 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 8 5  
(Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Co, 1987), 1.
© C a n a d ia n  M ili ta r y  H is to r y  24, no. 2 (Summer/Autumn 2015): 103-126
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recent postwar demobilisation.2 Through the 1950s, Canada grew 
its armed forces from 30,000 to 120,000 regulars, fought a hot war 
in Korea, deployed a standing garrison to Europe under the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (n a t o ), joined the North American 
Air Defence (n o r a d ) umbrella, led the United Nations’ first large 
peacekeeping mission in the wake of the Suez Crisis, all the while 
developing massive infrastructures on its home soil to support 
an unprecedented peacetime mobilisation.3 This stands in sharp 
contrast to the “Management Era”, deemed to have taken hold 
in 1964, sublimating the previous harmony through controversial 
innovations, the most well-known being Defence Minister Paul 
Hellyer’s plan to first integrate and then unify Canada’s three 
fighting services.4 In Bland’s view, the politician left his successors 
with “... an organization in great confusion, a military profession 
unsure of its values, its history, or its future, and with the old 
problems still firmly in place.”5
While an indictment of Hellyer the minister, this last statement 
also intimates that not all was well prior to 1964. The government 
of Progressive Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker had 
fallen to the Liberals of Lester Pearson in 1963 largely as a result of 
its inability to resolve defence dilemmas since taking power in 1957.6 
Neither Pearson nor Hellyer intended for such a fate to befall them 
and many observers have since linked unification to problems that
10 4  : F o r g in g  A  N o r m a tiv e  P r e s c r ip t io n  T h r o u g h  R a tio n a l A n a ly s is
2 See, among others, George F. G. Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers: The Military History 
of an Unmilitary People, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), 387-415; Desmond 
Morton, A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo, 4th ed. 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1999), 232-242; and J.L. Granatstein, Who Killed 
the Canadian Military? (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2004), 15-16.
3 Douglas Bland, “Military Command in Canada,” in Generalship and the Art of 
the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership (St. Catharines: 
Vanwell, 2000), 125; and Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian Military?, 4-5.
4 Daniel Gosselin, “The Storm over Unification of the Armed Forces: A Crisis of 
Canadian Civil-Military Relations,” in The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant: 
Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to the Present (Kingston: 
Canadian Defence Academy, 2007), 309-344; and Morton, A Military History of 
Canada, 247-254.
5 Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy, 53.
6 Paul Hellyer, Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada’s Armed Forces 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), 26-27; J. L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967: 
The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986), 220.
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arose under Diefenbaker.7 But several of these issues were in fact rooted 
in the legacy inherited from the previous Liberal government of Louis 
St. Laurent. It is this author’s contention that, despite the operational 
successes of the Canadian military and the apparent harmony of 
purpose between the political class and the officer corps during the 
early command era, civil-military relations (c m r ) in Canada actually 
vacillated through these years, leading to the crises that would follow.
This article will show that fluctuations closely matched the 
varying involvement of political authorities in defence matters while 
the professional outlook of military leaders remained a constant. This 
pattern lends itself particularly well to an analysis using the principal- 
agent framework proposed by Duke University professor Peter Feaver for 
the purpose of tracing the evolution of relations between these actors.8 
Such an exercise will not only shed light on a period less scrutinised 
than that of the Management Era but allow formulating a normative 
element of relevance to twenty-first century civil-military relations in 
Canada. To do so, the text will look at the varying friction between 
political leaders and military chiefs over the course of two successive 
periods, commencing with the uncertainties of the immediate post­
war years, then the seeming clarity of the Cold War buildup, before 
attempting to draw some prescriptive insights from these events. First 
though, Feaver’s Agency Theory will be discussed at greater length.
A G E N C Y  T H E O R Y
A recognised scholar of civil-military relations,9 Peter Feaver joined 
a body of authors in the mid-1990s who expressed concerns about
7 Bland, T h e  A d m in is tr a t io n  o f  D e fe n c e  P o lic y , 35-36; Vernon J. Kronenberg, A l l  
T o g e th e r  N o w : T h e  O r g a n iz a tio n  o f  th e  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  N a t io n a l D e fe n c e  in  C a n a d a , 
1 9 6 4 - 1 9 7 2 ,  W e lle s le y  P a p e r  3 / 1 9 7 3  (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs, 1973), 18-19; and R.L. Raymont, R e p o r t  o n  In te g r a tio n  a n d  U n ific a tio n ,  
1 9 6 4 - 1 9 6 8  (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1982), 2-15.
8 Peter D. Feaver, A r m e d  S e r v a n ts :  A g e n c y , O v e r s ig h t, a n d  C iv i l-M ilita r y  R e la t io n s  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
9 A  professor of political science and public policy at Duke University since 2003, 
Peter D. Feaver completed a PhD in Political Science at Harvard in 1990 and served 
in government twice, during the Clinton and George W . Bush administrations. He 
was also an officer in the United States Navy Reserves through the 1990s. Feaver 
writes about civil-military relations, security studies, and nuclear weapons. His 
academic resume can be found at https://fds.duke.edu/db/aas/PoliticalScience/ 
faculty/pfeaver/files/CV.pdf.
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a burgeoning crisis in the realm of c m r , particularly in the United 
States.10 Seeking to understand these tensions caused many authors 
to question the fundamentals of civil-military theory as the discipline 
looked underdeveloped and outdated, relying excessively on the 
works of early Cold War theorists such as Samuel Huntington and 
Morris Janowitz.11 Feaver took particular exception to the former’s 
prescriptive norm centred on the exercise of ‘objective control’ requiring 
that politicians concern themselves only with matters of policy and grand 
strategy while the military focused on operational and tactical matters. 
For the civilians to violate this divide would amount to ‘subjective 
control’, an encroachment detrimental to military effectiveness likely to 
lead to the politicisation of the officer corps.12
Feaver proposes, instead, a rationalist framework rooted in 
microeconomic game theory: “The principal-agent framework is 
designed to explore problems of agency, how political or economic 
actors in a superior position (principals) control the behavior of ... 
actors in a subordinate position (agents).”13 In pecuniary terms, the 
principal wishes to extract the maximum effort from the agent at a 
minimum cost; the agent, on the other hand, hopes to get away with 
the greatest reward for the least work. This proposition translates into 
a strategic interaction within a hierarchical relation in c m r  terms:
[T]he civilian principal contracts with the military agent to develop 
the ability to use force in defence of the civilian’s interests. Once the 
contract is established, the civilian principal seeks to ensure that the 
military agent does what civilians want while minimising the dangers 
associated with a delegation of power. The optimal mix of monitoring 
mechanisms is the one that minimises the incentives and opportunity
1 06 : F o r g in g  A  N o r m a tiv e  P r e s c r ip t io n  T h r o u g h  R a tio n a l A n a ly s is
10 Among others, see Charles J. Dunlap, “The Origins of the American Military 
Coup of 2012,” Parameters 22, no. 4 (Winter, 1992-1993), 2-20; Richard H. Kohn, 
“Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” The National Interest 35 
(Spring, 1994), 3-17; and Deborah Avant, “Conflicting Indicators of ‘Crisis’ in American 
Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 24, no. 3 (1998), 375-388.
11 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); and Morris 
Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe: Free 
Press, 1960).
12 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80-85. For a succinct yet thorough 
introduction to Huntington’s overarching theory, see Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme 
Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2002), 225-229.
13 Feaver, Armed Servants, 12.
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for the agent to flout the principal’s wishes, at the least cost to the 
principal and while preserving the efficiencies of specialisation that 
come with delegation.14
Agency Theory posits that the military— the agent— will either 
‘work’ or ‘shirk’ in discharging its end of the contract. It is regrettable 
that these terms may imply notions of diligence and indolence as 
Feaver uses them in quite a different way: “Working is doing things 
the way civilians want, and shirking is doing things the way those in 
the military want.”15 In other words, “... working involves a good faith 
effort to represent the principal’s interests. the ideal conduct that 
the agent would perform if the principal had full knowledge of what 
the agent could do and was in fact doing [emphasis in original].”16 
Shirking, as put by another author, “... occurs when the military 
either fails to diligently and skillfully do what the civilian asks, or 
does what the civilian asks in a manner which undercuts the civilian’s 
position of greater authority.”17 The resulting construct involves two 
cost-related variables: how intrusively will the principal monitor the 
agent’s actions— key here is that such ancillary mechanisms have 
costs attached to them in terms of time, resources, and potentially 
unproductive friction -  and whether the agent will deem the risk of 
getting caught shirking acceptable and the punishment tolerable.18 
These calculations may result in four outcomes as illustrated below:
Military Works Military Shirks
Civilian Intrusive 1 2
Civilian Non-Intrusive 3 4
1. Civilians monitor intrusively and military works (Huntington’s 
subjective control).





17 Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness,” 
Policy and Management Review 2, no. 2 (2002), 9.
18 Feaver, Armed Servants, 100-102.
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3. Civilians monitor non-intrusively and military works (Huntington’s 
objective control).
4. Civilians monitor non-intrusively and military shirks (Laswell’s 
garrison state).19
The concept is not without its critics.20 The model may be deemed 
overly simplistic due to its linear and binary nature and it evacuates 
any moral dimension from the concept of military professionalism. 
For political scientist and military historian Andrew Bacevich, the 
recourse to an agency framework reveals “...confusion over what it 
is we want in a civil-military relationship. Peter Feaver dodges the 
question altogether, content to devise a theory that does not speak 
to the normative question.”21 Nevertheless, these same shortcomings 
may commend Agency Theory for the study of c m r  in Canada 
during the period in question. The dearth of check-and-balance 
mechanisms within the Canadian defence policy-making apparatus 
at the time, at least when compared with the more complex u s  system, 
should prove suitable to a binary analysis where cabinet plays the 
role of principal and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (c o s c ) that of 
agent. Neither of these bodies achieved decisions without acrimonious 
internal debates but both of them presented fairly unanimous views
1 08 : F o r g in g  A  N o r m a tiv e  P r e s c r ip t io n  T h r o u g h  R a tio n a l A n a ly s is
19 Concerned with the potential for strategic bombing to dominate warfare in the 
future, requiring the mobilisation of entire societies on a permanent war footing, Yale 
political scientist Harold Laswell published in 1941 an influential article considering 
“... the possibility that we are moving toward a world of ‘garrison states’— a world 
in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society.” Though 
dated, this concept would be revisited in the United States whenever the military 
seemed to grow overly prominent such as at the height of the Cold War and during 
the post-9/11 decade. Harold D. Laswell, “The Garrison State,” A m e r ic a n  J o u r n a l  
o f  S o c io lo g y  46, no. 4 (January, 1941), 455-468.
20 For such critical views, see James Burk, “The Logic of Crisis and Civil-Military 
Relations Theory: A Comment on Desch, Feaver, and Dauber,” A r m e d  F o r c e s  &  S o c ie ty  
24, no. 3 (Spring, 1998), 459; and Charles A. Stevenson, W a rrio rs a n d  P o lit ic ia n s :  U S  
C iv il-M ilita r y  R e la t io n s  u n d e r  S tr e ss  (London: Routledge, 2006), 206.
21 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Absent History: A Comment on Dauber, Desch, and 
Feaver,” A r m e d  F o r c e s  &  S o c ie ty  24, no. 3 (Spring, 1998), 452. For a rebuttal, see 
Peter D. Feaver, “Modeling Civil-Military Relations: A Reply to Burk and Bacevich,” 
A r m e d  F o r c e s  &  S o c ie ty  24, no. 4 (Summer, 1998), 595-602.
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after such discussions.22 One will also note the remarkable similarity 
in professional experience of the few officers that made up the 
membership of the c o s c  during these years.23 The stability in the 
composition of the agent makes changes in the views and actions 
of the principal the key independent variable over time, facilitating 
the application of the theorem even further. Lastly, Feaver’s very 
refusal to formulate normative pronouncements in his study of 
American c m r — what ought to be done— leaves much room to 
build on a rationalist study of this historical case to draw some 
inferences relevant to the conduct of civil-military relations in 
Canada today.
D E B O B I L I S A T I O N
Following victory over the Axis powers, Canada set about returning 
to its traditional peacetime footing. Cabinet summarily dismissed the 
chiefs of staff’s ambitious plans for large standing forces and imposed 
a return to a small professional body geared toward supporting
22 Colonel R.L. Raymont was employed as Executive Staff Officer to the Chairman 
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee from 1951 to 1964 and then retained in the same 
role under the newly created position of Chief of Defence Staff from 1964 to 1968. He 
later stated that “... (a)s far as the writer recalls there have been only four occasions 
when the Chiefs of Staff failed to agree on any matters put before them" R. L. 
Raymont, T h e  E v o lu t io n  o f  th e  S tr u c tu r e  o f  th e  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  N a tio n a l D e fe n c e ,  
1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 8 :  R e p o r t  to  th e  T a sk  F o r c e  o n  R e v ie w  o f  U n ific a t io n  o f  th e  C a n a d ia n  
A r m e d  F o r c e s , Directorate of History and Heritage 87/47, 30 November 1979, 
Appendix A, 20.
23 General Charles Foulkes was a member throughout these years, first as chief of 
the General Staff (Commander of the Army) from 1945 to 1951 then assuming the 
position of Chairman (CCOS) and passing his army responsibilities to Guy Simmonds 
for the remainder of the period; only two chiefs of the Air Staff (Air Marshals Leckie 
then Curtis) and two chiefs of the Naval Staff (Vice Admirals Grant then Mainguy) 
sat in between 1947 and 1955. Dr. Omond Solandt would also become a permanent 
member upon his appointment as the first chairman of the Defence Research Board 
in 1947, a position he retained until 1956 and equivalent in status and authority 
as that of a military chief of staff. Jason S. Ridler, “Omond Solandt: Scientific 
Renaissance Man,” I N F O R  ( In fo r m a t io n  S y s te m s  a n d  O p e r a tio n a l R e s e a r c h )  46, no. 
4 (November, 2008), 227-228.
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national mobilisation were some future conflict to reoccur.24 25The 
principal had, thus, confirmed its leading role in formulating defence 
policy. Cabinet was selected as the principal for the purpose of this 
paper since such matters are executive prerogatives of the Crown, 
the sovereign power that nearly always act on the advice of those 
members of Parliament who form the governing cabinet.”26 The role 
of the larger Parliament is that of approving expenditures, a powerful 
lever but largely circumscribed by party discipline when put to a 
vote in the House of Commons under the Westminster system.
In fact, the principal could be narrowed down to the person of the 
prime minister given the sweeping executive powers the individual 
holds when compared to the American president, especially when 
controlling a majority of the seats in Parliament. Nevertheless, it is 
recognised that major decisions are debated and shaped in cabinet 
as the prime minister typically seeks consensus among colleagues 
in support of any given policy.26 Within this circle during the 
period in question, the minister of national defence (m n d ) played 
an active role in shepherding military issues along, those having 
been first considered in greater details within the Cabinet Defence 
Committee (c d c ). Stood up in August 1945 to replace the Cabinet 
War Committee, it was unprecedented as a peacetime institution, 
showing the continued interest of the political class in military affairs, 
especially as Prime Minister Mackenzie King himself assumed the 
chairmanship, a practice which would continue under his successor 
Louis St. Laurent.27
1 1 0  : F o r g in g  A  N o r m a tiv e  P r e s c r ip t io n  T h r o u g h  R a tio n a l A n a ly s is
24 This dramatic development is best summarised by Morton: “The navy asked 
for a task force with 2 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers, and 20,000 men. The army’s 
Plan G called for 55,788 regulars, 155,396 in the reserves, and a ‘training force’ of 
48,500 based on compulsory service. The RCAF proposals for 30,000 in a permanent 
force, 15,000 in auxiliary squadrons, and 50,000 in reserve sounded almost modest. 
Government response was frosty. The army’s yearning for conscription, declared 
Mackenzie King, was ‘perfectly outrageous.’ The RCN’s plan was cut in half; the army 
was lucky to be allowed 25,000 regulars and the RCAF would have to be content 
with 16,000.” Morton, A Military History of Canada, 227. For a more extensive 
discussion, see James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada— Volume III—Peacemaking 
Deterrence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1972), 77-88.
25 Philippe Lagasse, “Accountability for National Defence: Ministerial Responsibility, 
Military Command and Parliamentary Oversight,” IRPP Study 4 (March, 2010), 6.
26 J.E. Hodgetts, “Cabinet,” The Canadian Encyclopedia, last modified 14 March 
2014, available: http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/cabinet/.
27 Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, 107-109; and Raymont, The Evolution of 
the Structure of the Department of National Defence, 9.
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The c o s c  acted as agent within the meaning of Agency Theory. A 
loose Joint Staff Committee (j s c ) had been formed in the late 1920s 
to coordinate the three services but it had neither collective authority 
nor a chairman with overriding powers.28 Renamed the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee in January 1939, this body endured through the 
Second World War but effected little synchronisation of the armed 
forces. The army, navy and air force fought three separate service 
campaigns within the larger allied strategy, and then eyed each other 
warily during the uncertainties of peacetime demobilisation.29 30Brooke 
Claxton, appointed m n d  on 12 December 1946, played a pivotal role 
in invigorating the c o s c .30 Membership was consolidated into four 
principals: the chief of the general staff (commander of the army), the 
chiefs of the naval and the air staffs, and the chairman of the Defence 
Research Board, a senior defence scientist.
Attendance was regularly augmented with the department’s 
deputy minister, the undersecretary for external affairs, the deputy 
minister of finance and the secretary of the cabinet.31 The position 
of chairman did not exist but Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, 
in view of his seniority in rank, continued the wartime practice of 
acting as de facto chair.32 Although the right of service chiefs to meet 
with the minister individually remained in place, Claxton sought 
to establish the c o s c  as the source of collective military advice to 
the minister in response to government priorities and objectives, as 
outlined in the committee’s revised terms of reference promulgated 
on 30 June 1947:
To advise the Minister of National Defence and the Cabinet Defence 
Committee on matters of defence policy and to prepare strategic 
appreciations and military plans as required. To be responsible for 
coordinating the efforts of the Armed Services in fulfilment of a single
28 Douglas Bland, C h ie fs  o f  D e fe n c e :  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  th e  U n ified  C o m m a n d  o f  
th e  C a n a d ia n  A r m e d  F o r c e s  (Toronto: Brown Book, 1995), 32-33; and C.P. Stacey, 
A r m s , M e n  a n d  G o v e r n m e n t:  T h e  W ar P o l i c ie s  o f  C a n a d a , 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 5  (Ottawa: The 
Queen’s Printer for Canada, 1970), 69.
29 Bland, C h ie fs  o f  D e fe n c e , 40-42; and Stacey, A r m s , M e n  a n d  G o v e r n m e n t, 108­
109 and 128-129.
30 Bercuson, T r u e  P a tr io t:  T h e  L i f e  o f  B r o o k e  C la x to n , 1 8 8 9 -1 9 6 0  (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993), 155.
31 Raymont, T h e  E v o lu t io n  o f  th e  S tr u c tu r e  o f  th e  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  N a tio n a l D e fe n c e ,  
25; and Eayrs, P e a c e m a k in g  a n d  D e te r r e n c e , 114.
32 Kronenberg, A l l  T o g eth e r  N o w , 11; and Stacey, A r m s , M e n  a n d  G o v e r n m e n t, 126.
9
: Canadian Civil-Military Relations in the Early “Command Era,” 1945-1955
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
1 1 2  : F o r g in g  A  N o r m a tiv e  P r e s c r ip t io n  T h r o u g h  R a tio n a l A n a ly s is
defence policy ... To investigate and consider in common all matters 
which may be referred to the Committee by the ministers or the Cabinet 
Defence Committee.33
Thus, as noted by his biographer, Claxton sought to establish 
the c o s c  as an important body in the execution of defence policy but 
also carefully circumscribed its relation to government: “Henceforth, 
the service chiefs would report to the c d c  through Claxton; he 
would decide what would go forward and what would not.”34 In this 
sense, the principal obtained the means to intrusively monitor the 
performance of the agent in response to cabinet directions. Such close 
control of the defence agenda was required as the prime minister had 
assigned the m n d  a strict mandate of peacetime consolidation and 
drastic reduction of expenditures.35 Claxton was leery of the support 
he would get from the chiefs in this endeavour, noting in his memoirs 
that military planners “... live and work without regards for the facts 
of national life. Unless they are very closely supervised, they are 
apt to draw up plans that are utterly unrealistic and impossible of 
fulfilment.”36
The challenge was compounded as the minister sought to 
formulate a lasting postwar defence policy. Shaping an independent 
position within the nascent East-West confrontation would prove 
challenging but Claxton carried this through, limiting military 
input in this process and working instead with Arnold Heeney, clerk 
of the Privy Council and secretary to the cabinet, Canada’s most 
influential civil servant at the time.37 On 9 July 1947, while presenting 
the department’s estimates to the House of Commons, the minister 
outlined Canadian fundamentals that lasted for the remainder of the 
Cold War, if not to this day. In his words, the country’s armed forces 
were required:
1. to defend Canada against aggression; 2. to assist the civil power 
in maintaining law and order within the country; 3. to carry out
33 Raymont, T h e  E v o lu tio n  o f  th e  S tr u c tu r e  o f  th e  D e p a r tm e n t o f  N a tio n a l D e fe n c e , 25.
34 Bercuson, T r u e  P a tr io t , 162.
35 Ibid., 159; Bland, T h e  A d m in is tr a t io n  o f  D e fe n c e  P o lic y , 13; and Eayrs, 
P e a c e m a k in g  a n d  D e te r r e n c e , 23-24.
36 Cited in James Eayrs, I n  D e fe n c e  o f  C a n a d a — V o lu m e I V — G r o w in g  U p A l l i e d  
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1980), 132.
37 Bercuson, T r u e  P a tr io t , 173.
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Brooke Claxton, Minister of Defence 
1946-1954. [Library and Archives Canada 
PA-047064]
any undertaking which by our own voluntary act we may assume in 
cooperation with friendly nations or under any effective plan of collective 
action under the united nations [sic] ... [O]ur first line of defence and the 
object of all our policy must be to work with other nations to prevent 
war.38
In the same statement, Claxton listed several ‘long-term objects of the 
department and services’, the first of which was the “ ... [progressively 
closer co-ordination of the armed services and unification of the 
Department so as to form a single defence force in which the three 
armed services work together as a team "39 As pointed out by Bland, 
it is important to note that these priorities and objectives “ ... were 
derived from Canadian needs and circumstances. They were not 
driven by external commitments, nor were they foreign to Canadian 
citizens"40 Several breached Huntington’s divide by addressing lower- 
level organisational and operational issues belonging to the military
38 Canada, O f fic ia l  R e p o r t  o f  D e b a te s :  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s :  3 rd  S e s s io n  2 0 th  
P a r lia m e n t , V o lu m e  V I 1 9 4 7  (Ottawa: Controller of Stationary, 1948), 5270.
39 Ibid., 5272.
40 Bland, T h e  A d m in is tr a t io n  o f  D e fe n c e  P o lic y ,  15.
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realm such as the formation of joint intelligence and planning 
groups, the integration of arsenals, seeking common standards with 
‘like-minded countries’, etc. Nevertheless, meeting little opposition 
in Parliament and among the public, actively supported by prime 
ministers Mackenzie King and St. Laurent after 1948, Claxton set 
about implementing his plan, focussing on a force of 42,225 regulars 
to form a modest base for mobilisation using stockpiles retained 
from the previous conflict.41
As well, the minister continued his quest for greater efficiencies 
and budget savings through the elimination of duplications among 
the branches of the armed forces, establishing the Combined Services 
Functions Committee, which laid the basis for merging sixteen of the 
thirty-one functions it examined.42 By then, he had already instructed 
the rearrangement of the three services headquarters along parallel 
divisions, the promulgation of common military personnel policies, 
the merger of the three sets of civilian administrators into a single 
defence civil service under one deputy minister, and an amendment to 
the National Defence Act to provide for one group of military laws.43
There was little the military agent could do to pre-empt the will 
of the civilian principal in these circumstances, even had the c o s c  
wished to. Although convinced that the debilitating retrenchments 
of the interwar period should not be repeated, and under pressure 
from their American counterparts concerned with the nascent 
requirements for continental air defence,44 dire recruiting made it 
difficult for the chiefs to militate for larger armed forces in Canada. 
A  good economy, meagre military pay, and underwhelming prospects 
for action contributed to severe personnel shortages in the three 
services with just under 34,000 regulars serving in 1948, well short 
of the authorised ceiling.45 On the other hand, officers appreciated 
that most personnel staying in were highly trained combat veterans, 
equipped with proven gear, standing ready to support another
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41 Bercuson, True Patriot, 177; and Peter Kasurak, A National Force: The Evolution 
of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 11-12.
42 Bercuson, True Patriot, 161; and Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, 118.
43 Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy, 16.
44 Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and 
the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958 (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1987), 9-29.
45 Bercuson, True Patriot, 177; Kasurak, A National Force, 12; and Marc Milner, 
Canada’s Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 184.
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mobilisation effort if required in the future. The military agent had 
seen its postwar ambitions defeated but carried on maintaining a 
small but effective force as dictated by government. In other words, 
the principal monitored intrusively and the agent worked, a situation 
of subjective control which, despite Huntington’s normative concern, 
provided the country with suitable armed forces within an effective 
c m r  dialogue for the circumstances prevailing at the time. However, 
as soon as this equilibrium was set, growing tensions on the world 
scene precipitated unexpected developments in Canada.
R E M O B I L I S A T I O N
Cold War divisions led Ottawa to join n a t o  in 1949 and deploy 
forces to Korea the following year.46 The 1949-1950 defence budget 
had been $384 million but, by 1953, it reached $1,907 million, ten 
times that of 1947.47 48This striking turnaround was reflective of 
the commonalities of views that existed among the political class 
and military leaders on the necessity of dedicating such immense 
national wealth to the East-West confrontation. Indeed, a symbiosis 
of sorts was achieved between Claxton, by then fully in charge of 
his portfolio, and General Foulkes, whose prominence in military 
affairs was reinforced when designated on 1 February 1951 as the 
first chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (c c o s c ) .48 A cabinet 
appointment, the post had been created in response to n a t o ’s 
requirement for a single national representative to the organisation’s 
Military Committee and fitted well in Claxton’s vision of greater 
integration between the services. The choice of Foulkes symbolised 
the confidence of the civilian principal in his performance, especially
46 For an extensive treatment of the circumstances surrounding Canada’s adherence 
to NATO and the role of her diplomats and military leaders in shaping the original 
treaty, see Eayrs, G r o w in g  U p A l l i e d , 68-128. For Canada joining the fight in 
Korea, see Stanley, C a n a d a ’s  S o ld ie r s , 399-401; Milner, C a n a d a ’s  N a v y , 201-204; 
and Bercuson, T r u e  P a t r io t , 208-216.
47 Morton, A  M ilita r y  H is to r y  o f  C a n a d a , 238.
48 Kronenberg, A l l  T o g e th e r  N o w , 15.
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as the Canadian general was also designated the first chairman of the 
alliance’s Military Committee for a two-year rotation (1951-1953).49 50
Joining n a t o  proved a dramatic departure for Canada. The 
organisation was the first peacetime alliance provided with its own 
multinational political apparatus (the North Atlantic Council— n a c ), 
integrated command structure (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe— s h a p e ), and assigned standing forces (Allied Command 
Europe— a c e ).50 Its immediate focus was the defence of the Western 
European allies against an invasion by the Soviet Union, which held 
an overwhelming superiority in conventional means. n a t o  countries 
committed to building up their forces through national ‘force goals’, 
whereby each country pledged army, naval and air contingents, as 
well as taking on specific roles and missions within the alliance’s 
larger strategy. However, as the Lisbon Conference of February 1952 
concluded its proceedings, troop targets had reached overly ambitious 
levels in seeking to muster on European soil ninety-six army divisions 
and 10,000 aircraft by 1954.51 The allies would struggle for the 
remainder of the 1950s to meet such force goals while faith in the 
American nuclear guarantee would be shaken as the Soviets developed 
the means to strike at North America with their own atomic devices.
Canadian engagement with n a t o  did not fundamentally alter 
the three defence tasks proposed by minister Claxton in 1947 
but the allied strategy did impact the ‘long-term objects of the 
department and the services’ outlined in that same statement. These 
envisioned a small cadre of regular forces available to conduct but 
a few immediate military missions as their main priority would be 
to support a large mobilisation, very much as they had done at the 
outset of the Second World War.52 But n a t o  assumed that war was 
imminent, would commence without warning, and that reserve forces
49 Yet one must not make too much of the significance of the position within the 
Canadian military structure at the time. The Chairman was meant as an impartial
broker between the three services but he had no overriding authority on them and
they retained their right of individual access to the minister. Ibid., 15; Raymont, 
The Evolution of the Structure, Appendix A, 19-22; and Sean M. Maloney, “General 
Charles Foulkes: A Primer on How to be CDS,” in Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on 
Senior Canadian Military Leaders (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), 224 and 226.
50 For Canadian perspectives on the genesis of these NATO organs, see Eayrs, 
Growing Up Allied, 130-189.
51 Ibid., 222-224; and Lawrence Freedman, The Cold War: A Military History 
(London: Cassell, 2001), 48.
52 Kasurak, A National Force, 11-12; and Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers, 389-390.
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would be too late in joining the fight. For the first time, the country 
was called upon to maintain large standing forces, including forces- 
in-being permanently garrisoned overseas. Others were earmarked 
for immediate deployment at the start of the hostilities while ships 
and aircraft would take up pre-designated war stations without 
further instructions. Most would act under the operational control of 
foreign alliance commanders.53 The Militia, the mainstay of military 
tradition in Canada from colonial days to the world wars of the 
twentieth century, would eventually be relegated to civil defence 
duties, tasked to look after survivors in the wake of an apocalyptic 
nuclear exchange.54
These developments did not immediately impact civil-military 
relations in Canada. As national force goals and missions were agreed 
to by political authorities in n a t o  summits and endorsed by cabinet, 
the c o s c , as the agent, was content to perform the contractual 
engagement of building up the necessary forces. O f greater interest 
was whether the principal would continue to monitor as intrusively 
during this period of remobilisation as it had done during the recent 
demobilisation. On the one hand, the appointment of Ralph Campney 
as the first peacetime associate minister in November 1952 seemed 
to indicate the renewed interest of political authorities for military 
matters by providing increased monitoring capacity.55 Influential civil 
servants continued to attend c o s c  meetings as well as those of the 
Cabinet Defence Committee, remaining fully engaged in the military 
buildup and the evolution of n a t o  strategy.56
On the other hand, several factors contributed to distract 
the attention of Canadian politicians at this critical juncture. On 
a personal level, after nearly seven years of strenuous service as 
minister, Brooke Claxton had grown weary, if not exhausted. Having 
already spent much time standing up for the r c n  in the wake of 
the 1949 Mainguy Report (concerned with morale in the navy),57 
Claxton then had to wage a lengthy battle with the opposition and
53 Bland, T h e  A d m in is tr a t io n  o f  D e fe n c e  P o l ic y , 18-21; and Eayrs, G r o w in g  Up 
A l l ie d , 190-222.
54 Kasurak, A  N a tio n a l F o r c e, 45-48; and Morton, A  M ilita r y  H isto r y  o f  C a n a d a , 245.
55 Bercuson, T r u e  P a t r io t , 246.
56 Examples can be found throughout chapters 4 (“Mobilizing the Deterrent”) and 
5 (“Sharing the Burden”) of Eayrs, G r o w in g  Up A l l i e d , 190-318; as well as chapter 
11 (“Korea and NATO (1950-52)”) in Bercuson, T r u e  P a t r io t , 207-239.
57 Bercuson, T r u e  P a t r io t , 183-186; and Milner, C a n a d a ’s  N a v y , 193-195.
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the media upon the release of the Currie Report in December 1952, a 
devastating document revealing widespread accounting malpractices 
in the army.58 The minister also put on hold any further attempts at 
integration from the top given the myriad of priorities then driving 
the expanding defence agenda.59 Grieving over the loss of his twenty- 
two-year son in a fishing accident, Claxton eventually retired in 
July 1954.60 Meanwhile the larger political class had embarked on 
an election campaign in the summer of 1953 just as the Korean 
Armistice Agreement was signed, removing much of the public’s 
attention and operational pressures of being engaged in a ‘hot war’.61
As political interest for defence issues started receding, n a t o ’s 
strategy underwent another fundamental review. Given the alliance’s 
inability to mount a credible conventional deterrent, the Eisenhower 
administration announced its ‘New Look’ policy in October 1953, 
stating its willingness to use nuclear weapons to deter both a strategic 
strike against North America and a conventional assault against 
Western Europe (and allies beyond).62 This, in turn, led the Atlantic 
Alliance to adopt in November 1954 the strategic concept outlined in 
MC 48. That document assumed that a Soviet move across the Iron 
Curtain with conventional forces would in all likelihood result in the 
use of atomic bombs in the early stage of the war, including tactical 
weapons to destroy enemy formations before they could overwhelm 
the Western allies.63 Having replaced Claxton as minister of national 
defence, Campney proclaimed the country’s adherence to these views 
in March 1955, stating that “... MC48 (Final) was approved and 
represents Canadian government policy. This policy provides that 
priority must be given to the provision of forces being capable of 
effectively contributing to success in the initial phase.”64 Although
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58 Bercuson, True Patriot, 246-257; and Morton, A Military History of Canada, 238.
59 Kronenberg, All Together Now, 15-16; and Bland, Chiefs of Defence, 49-50.
60 Bercuson, True Patriot, 238-241.
61 Ibid., 257-258; and Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers, 405-406.
62 Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in 
Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, 2nd ed. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), 739-744; and Russell F. Weigley, The American 
Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1973), 400-404.
63 Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons During the 
Cold War (Washington: Potomac Books, 2007), 38-43; and Marc Trachtenberg, 
History & Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 153-165.
64 Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 47.
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Dwight Eisenhower speaks with Pierre Dupuy and Brooke Claxton (right) in Rotterdam, 
November 1951. [Nationaal Archief (Netherlands) 904-8601]
the remainder of the statement did not formally commit Canada 
to acquiring nuclear weapons, it clearly endorsed their use at the 
tactical level and opened the door to such a consideration by putting 
the emphasis on forces capable of operating on the atomic battlefield.
This remarkable development caused little questioning within 
Canadian political circles, not that the military agent had left 
the civilian principal in the dark. Foulkes and the chiefs had been 
discussing these concerns with their allied military partners since 
1951 and senior civil servants were eventually brought in to further 
define Canada’s position. Secretary of State for External Affairs 
Lester Pearson also played an important role in shaping MC 48 
when it was brought within the political realm at the North Atlantic 
Council.65 Nevertheless, it appears that not much debate ensued when 
the subject was raised in cabinet and one must ponder whether the 
ministers fully comprehended the ramifications of the policy put to 
them by their agent.
A similar concern arises when considering the greater integration 
of continental defence pursued simultaneously by military planners. 
Extensive discussions had been taking place within the Canada-us
65 Ibid., 40-47; and Eayrs, Growing Up Allied, 262-273.
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Military Cooperation Committee, an organ added in 1946 to the 
wartime bilateral Permanent Joint Board on Defence (p j b d ), which 
continued into the postwar era.66 As the threat of Soviet bombers 
to North America grew through the following decade, United States 
Air Force and r c a f  authorities came to envision a defence based 
on four pillars: timely signal intelligence (through passive sensors 
spread along the Soviet periphery); attrition at source of the enemy 
bomber force by Strategic Air Command (s a c ); active sensors mostly 
based in Canada’s North to provide early warning; and the ability 
to disrupt an attack through area and point defence means (fighters 
and ground-based interceptor missiles dispersed in Canada and the 
United States).67
Military effectiveness required ever greater integration of these 
means, resulting in a range of incremental initiatives to that effect. 
Canada granted rights to the United States to use Goose Bay, 
Newfoundland as an alternate wartime bomber base in 1950.68 It 
was agreed in 1951 that American and Canadian fighters could 
enter each other’s air space to complete air interceptions and, later, 
that they could do the same pre-emptively to initiate an intercept.69 
The Pinetree radar line commenced operations in 1952 with sites 
mounted in southern Canada to cover North America’s industrial 
heartland. Warning times would then be extended with the decision 
in 1953 to build the Mid-Canada Line further north and, in 1954, 
the Distant Early Warning Line in Canada’s high Arctic.70 By 1955, 
technology had sufficiently evolved to envision an air battle over 
North America coordinated through the proposed Semi-Automatic 
Ground Environment (s a g e ), networking weapons and sensors of both 
nations.71 But these developments had yet to be discussed extensively
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66 Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 4; and Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 10-29.
67 Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 26.
68 Ibid., 12-13. This agreement also provided for overflight rights in Canadian 
airspace for American (and, later in the decade, British) nuclear-armed bombers 
conducting peacetime transits.
69 Joseph T. Jockel, “The Military Establishments and the Creation of NORAD,” 
in Canada’s Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: 
Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), 165.
70 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 43-50 and 72-85; and Maloney, Learning to 
Love the Bomb, 23-26 and 34.
71 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 62; and Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 24.
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in the Canadian cabinet despite the inherent challenges they involved 
in terms of national command and sovereignty.72
This pronouncement reflects two important trends in the 
evolution of c m r  in Canada in terms of agency. First, the principal 
had been acting much less intrusively in the management of military 
affairs, a tendency begun in the waning days of Claxton’s tenure 
as minister and continued under Campney, who would prove 
more a caretaker than an active shaper of policy as viewed by a 
contemporary observer: “(The minister) seemed content to adopt a 
low profile and preferred to act to recommendations of the Chiefs of 
Staff in implementing defence policy rather than the initiation of new 
measures.”73 This laissez-faire was also reflective of Prime Minister 
St. Laurent who—  contrary to his predecessor Mackenzie King—  
was reluctant to intervene in the day-to-day affairs of his cabinet 
colleagues, a tendency that was likely to produce quite different results 
when dealing with a proactive Claxton in the 1940s and a reluctant 
Campney in the 1950s.74 Secondly, the agent’s contractual obligations 
seemed to migrate ever so subtly from serving Canadian priorities to 
those of the larger alliance as the country’s defence policy came to 
narrowly reflect a ‘strategy of commitments’ dictated by the needs 
of n a t o  and continental defence.75 As pointed out by Douglas Bland, 
military Chiefs came to “... identify their professional responsibilities 
and institutional interest with strategies written outside Canada.”76 
A former Chief of the Defence Staff subsequently observed that the 
officer corps “. had great difficulty differentiating between its own 
institutional interests and aspirations, and the real interests of the 
state, viewing both as coincident when, in fact, they are often very 
different.”77
72 Jockel, “The Military Establishments and the Creation of NORAD,” 171-172; 
and Granatstein, C a n a d a  1 9 5 7 - 1 9 6 7 , 102-105.
73 Colonel R.L. Raymont quoted in Maloney, L e a r n in g  to  L o v e  th e  B o m b , 32. See 
also Bland, C h ie fs  o f  D e f e n c e , 52.
74 Eayrs, P e a c e m a k in g  a n d  D e te r r e n c e , 14.
75 Bland, T h e  A d m in is tr a t io n  o f  D e fe n c e  P o l ic y , 21; and Peter T. Haydon, T h e  1 9 6 2  
C u b a n  M is s i le  C r is is :  C a n a d ia n  I n v o lv e m e n t  R e c o n s id e r e d  (Toronto: The Canadian 
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 49-51.
76 Bland, “Military Command in Canada,” 129.
77 Gerry Theriault, “Democratic Civil-Military Relations: A Canadian View,” 
in T h e  M ili ta r y  in  M o d e r n  D e m o c r a t ic  S o c ie t y  (Toronto: Canadian Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 1996), 10.
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The matter of the agent’s greater adherence to alliance 
commitments rather than that of the national interest as envisioned 
by the principal is worthy of mention in this evaluation as Canadian 
civil-military relations did not evolve in isolation. The influence of 
Canada’s allies could in fact be included as an additional independent 
variable in the application of Feaver’s analysis to this case. The Basic 
Security Plan (b s p ) negotiated by the military authorities in 1946 
and agreed to in February 1947 by the Canadian and American 
governments provided an initial rational for maintaining minimal 
standing forces in being, at least in terms of ships and aircraft, to 
respond to the continental defense responsibilities implied therein.78 
Canadian generals and admirals would refer to n a t o  force goals 
long after the 1952 Lisbon Conference to shape their force estimates 
and budget submissions to the minister. However, neither Mackenzie 
King nor St. Laurent viewed the b s p  as a formal defence pact—  
thus undercutting its value as a basis for the military establishment 
to lobby for increased allocations— while both the principal and the 
agent shared a common commitment to meeting the requirements 
generated by the Atlantic Alliance to the end of the period covered 
in this paper. It would be after the mid-1950s that divergences over 
such commitments would assume a greater role in the context of civil- 
military relations in Canada and provide an avenue for advocates 
from abroad to act as an independent variable worthy of inclusion 
within an agency theory analysis of those later years.
P R E S C R I P T I O N
The events discussed above indicate that once Canada was firmly 
engaged on a course of Cold War mobilisation, 1951 being the 
approximate turning point, Canadian c m r  went through a subtle 
but fundamental realignment as the principal slowly abandoned 
its most intrusive ways of monitoring. That is not to say that the 
military went about shirking from thereon. Indeed, the chiefs of 
staff continued to work diligently in mounting the forces required 
to achieve the n a t o  and continental defence objectives assigned to
78 Milner, Canada’s Navy, 167-168; and Ray Stouffer, Swords, Clunks & 
Widowmakers: The Tumultuous Life of the RCAF’s Original 1 Canadian Air 
Division (Trenton: Canadian Forces Air Warfare Centre, 2015), 17.
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Canada. In agency terms, Foulkes and his colleagues did not “fail to 
diligently and skillfully do what the civilian asked, or did what the 
civilian asked in a manner which undercut the civilian’s position of 
greater authority.” Rather, they pursued military effectiveness to the 
extent that the principal let them. In that sense, civilian-military 
relations had gone from a period of subjective control during the 
demobilisation phase to one of objective control with the principal 
refraining from intervening in the crafting of military strategy and 
the details of its implementation.
This evolution should have translated into a positive development 
from a Huntingtonian perspective as the principal did not monitor 
intrusively and yet the agent worked. However, the issues that came 
to the fore after Diefenbaker took power in 1957, contributing with 
such deleterious effect to the ensuing crisis in civil-military relations, 
came about largely as a result of military initiatives in the preceding 
years. Unilateral adherence to n a t o  strategy would eventually call 
for troops and aircraft equipped with tactical nuclear weapons—  
Honest John rockets for the army, Mk28 thermonuclear bombs for 
the air force’s c f -104s, atomic depth charges for the Navy— while 
government had not yet committed to acquire such weapons.79 
Continental defence necessitated different interceptors than those 
used in Europe, leading to the promulgation of unique requirements 
that called for the unaffordable CF-105 (the failed Avro Arrow 
project), as well as the demand for nuclear-tipped missiles for the 
c f -101 fighters and the b o m a r c  land-based batteries.80 Necessary 
sovereignty compromises were not fully comprehended by civilian 
authorities until after they had signed the n o r a d  agreement and such 
fundamental misunderstandings would contribute to the confused 
reaction of Canada to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.81 By 1964, 
Canada could no longer afford its armed forces. Newly appointed 
Minister of National Defence Hellyer could reclaim Claxton’s aphorism 
that “military planners live and work without regards for the facts
79 Maloney, L ea rn in g  to L o v e the B o m b , 159-170; and Kasurak, A  N a tio n a l Force, 67-73.
80 Maloney, L e a r n in g  to  L o v e  th e  B o m b , 59-67; and Granatstein, C a n a d a  1 9 5 7 ­
1 9 6 7 , 105-109.
81 Jockel, N o  B o u n d a r ie s  U p sta irs , 104-111; and Haydon, T h e  19 6 2  C u b a n  M is s i le  
C r is is , 218-219.
21
: Canadian Civil-Military Relations in the Early “Command Era,” 1945-1955
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
1 2 4  : F o r g in g  A  N o r m a tiv e  P r e s c r ip t io n  T h r o u g h  R a tio n a l A n a ly s is
of national life” and ignore the c o s c  as he set about publishing his 
controversial White Paper.82
Determining the right and wrong of the arguments used by the 
camps involved in the defence debates of the Diefenbaker years is well 
beyond the purview of this paper.83 However, the study of the first 
decade of the command era underscores key findings. The rational 
analysis used therein illuminated effective civil-military relations 
during the demobilisation period despite unfolding in conditions of 
subjective control. The remobilisation that followed was accompanied 
by a subtle transition to objective control but this did not equate to 
the betterment of c m r  as Huntington would have posited. A  crisis 
did not immediately arise since the military agent continued to 
work but the erosion of civilian oversight led to a growing gap in 
the interpretation of the civil-military contract. The agent pursued 
forms of military effectiveness that would not necessarily be endorsed 
by the principal had it remained closely involved, a dissonance that 
came to the fore with a vengeance when the latter resumed more 
intrusive monitoring.
This rational analysis suggests a fundamental normative 
prescription contrary to the Huntingtonian diktat. Thriving civil- 
military relations in a liberal democracy such as Canada require the 
continued involvement of the political class in defining the country’s 
defence policy, determining the strategy to implement it, and 
scrutinising its detailed execution. The military should accept, and 
indeed should demand some form of intrusive monitoring by civilian 
authorities over the long term, whether defence issues are topical or 
not at any given time. This would allow for a continued dialogue 
between politicians and the officer corps to educate each other on 
their current concerns and interests, and avoid sudden disruptions in
82 Department of National Defence, 1964 White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: 
Department of National Defence, 1964), available: http://publications.gc.ca/ 
collections/collection_20i2/dn-nd/D3-6-i964-eng.pdf. For a precis, see Douglas L. 
Bland, “Controlling the Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence 
and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence,” in Canada’s 
Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: Copp Clark 
Pitman, 1993), 212-215.
83 Adequate summaries and discussions on this topic may be found in chapter 5 
(“The Defence Debacle, 1957-1963)” of Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967, 101-138; 
Morton, A Military History of Canada, 242-246; and J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, “Unification 
and the Strong-Service Idea,” in The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives— 
Context and Concepts (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 136-137.
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c m r  as a result of dissonances appearing during periods of isolation 
between the two camps.
C O N C L U S I O N
Few doubt that Canada achieved a great deal as a middle power 
during the 1950s and many have cited a seeming congruence between 
the political class and the officer corps as a key factor for these 
successes. Huntington’s supporters would argue that objective 
control was largely responsible for this situation as the normative 
ideal for a liberal democracy was in place at the time. And yet, 
this essay demonstrated that the receding political oversight 
of rapidly evolving military developments during these years 
would contribute to later c m r  crises as the country’s strategy of 
alliance commitments grew unaffordable. Adopting a rationalist 
framework to analyze the early command era in Canada allows 
one to formulate an initial normative prescription centered on the 
continuous involvement of the civilian principal in military affairs. 
While such intrusive monitoring of the agent may seem improper 
as a form of subjective control, unbroken dialogue of the sort that 
took place during the late 1940s would alleviate the potential for 
the military to shirk in response to unexpected interventions by 
politicians in defence matters. Regrettably, Feaver’s Agency Theory 
falls short of providing a solution to the challenge of gaining and 
maintaining such dedicated interest from the political class, an 
issue likely to continue bedeviling civil-military relations in Canada 
in the future.
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